ADJ18291836 · October 12, 2026

The WCJ's negative credibility finding was challenged as unsupported by substantial evidence; applicant's testimony was unrebutted and unimpeached; the Appeals Board found substantial evidence to support a contrary finding and granted reconsideration for further review.

From the decision · page 6First, in workers’ compensation proceedings, when a WCJ’s credibility determinations are based on substantial evidence, they are “entitled to great weight because of the [WCJ’s] ‘opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their statements in connection with their manner on the stand...’ [Citation.]” (Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 318-319 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; also see Meiner v. Ford Motor Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 127, 140-141.) However, “the Appeals Board is entitled to reject the [WCJ’s] findings on credibility matters if substantial evidence supports contrary findings...” (Garza, supra, 3 Cal.3d at 318-319.) In this case, it appears that the WCJ’s negative assessment of applicant’s credibility may need to be rescinded as it does not appear to be based on substantial evidence, and there is substantial evidence to support a contrary finding.

Applicant's testimony was unrebutted and unimpeached, and defendant failed to produce a supervising employee to rebut or impeach applicant's testimony.

Favours Applicant prevailed

This undermines the WCJ's negative credibility finding and supports reconsideration and further review of injury AOE/COE.

From the decision · page 8Here, although defendant was in the position to produce a supervising employee to whom applicant claimed to have reported the alleged workplace injury, defendant did not do so. Witness testimony that they simply “do not recall” cannot be relied on for purposes of rebuttal or impeachment. Unless defendant can rebut or impeach applicant’s testimony, corroborating testimony would be unnecessary. Therefore, the record in this matter on the issue of whether the alleged injury is AOE/COE will need further evaluation and/or further development. Accordingly, the WCJ’s decision is subject to rescission and either new findings of fact and order, or rescission and return to the trial level for further development of the record.

Found applicant's history credible but medical opinion relying on applicant's history does not compel finding of industrial injury if factual history is not persuasive.

The AME found the applicant's history credible but the WCJ did not find the underlying factual history persuasive, so the medical opinion did not compel a finding of industrial injury.

From the decision · page 3Finally, applicant argues that the Agreed Medical Evaluator (AME), Dr. Moses Jacob (Applicant’s Exhibit 1), found her history credible and that this compels a finding of industrial injury. It does not. The applicant bore the burden of proving injury arising out of and in the course of employment under LC § 3202.5. The WCJ remained the trier of fact as to witness credibility and the

Labor Code §§ 5400, 5401(a), 5402(a); California Insurance Guarantee Association v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Carls) (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 853; Permanente Medical Group v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Martin) (1985) 39 Cal.3d 57;

An employer is required to provide a claim form to an employee within one day of notice or knowledge of an alleged work injury. An employer can receive notice or knowledge via service by the injured worker or someone on his/her behalf. Service includes knowledge sufficient to afford opportunity to investigate the facts. The duty of notification arises when the employer has actual or constructive knowledge of any work-related injury.

The WCJ misstates the law related to how an employer can receive notice of a workplace injury; the issue of notice and tolling under sections 5405, 5402, and related case law needs further evaluation.

From the decision · page 6416.) In addition, the remaining grounds for the WCJ’s negative credibility finding against applicant are based on an inaccurate assessment of what constitutes “notice or knowledge of an alleged work injury,” and may not ultimately persuade should the WCJ’s negative credibility finding against applicant be rescinded and evidentiary weight thereby given to her testimony that she was dissuaded from pursuing workers’ compensation by a supervising employee, and to the opinions of the AME. It is also our preliminary finding that the WCJ misstates the law related to how an employer can receive notice of a workplace injury. (See Report, p. 5.) An employer is required to provide a claim form to an employee within one day of notice or knowledge of an alleged work injury. (Lab. Code, § 5401(a).) An employer can receive “notice or knowledge of an alleged work injury” via service by the injured worker or someone on his/her behalf. (Lab. Code, § 5400.) “Service” includes, “[k]nowledge of an injury, obtained from any source, on the part of an employer...or knowledge of the assertion of a claim of injury sufficient to afford opportunity to the employer to make an investigation into the facts...” (Lab. Code, § 5402(a).) Thus, the duty of notification arises when the employer has “‘...actual or constructive knowledge of any work-

Applicant's testimony was unrebutted and unimpeached; defendant failed to produce a supervising employee to rebut or impeach applicant's testimony; witness testimony that they do not recall cannot be relied on for rebuttal or impeachment.

From the decision · page 8Here, although defendant was in the position to produce a supervising employee to whom applicant claimed to have reported the alleged workplace injury, defendant did not do so. Witness testimony that they simply “do not recall” cannot be relied on for purposes of rebuttal or impeachment. Unless defendant can rebut or impeach applicant’s testimony, corroborating testimony would be unnecessary. Therefore, the record in this matter on the issue of whether the alleged injury is AOE/COE will need further evaluation and/or further development. Accordingly, the WCJ’s decision is subject to rescission and either new findings of fact and order, or rescission and return to the trial level for further development of the record.