Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Labor Code section 5813
Labor Code section 5813 provides for sanctions against parties engaging in bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
Applied to assess whether defendant's delay in authorizing surgery was sanctionable bad faith.
From the decision · page 5II
In addition to the analysis outlined in the Report incorporated hereto, we add the following
analysis.
Section 5813 provides that "[t]he workers' compensation referee or appeals board may
order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees and costs, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay" (Lab. Code, § 5813(a).)
WCAB Rule 10421, promulgated under section 5813, discusses the nature and scope of
conduct that is subject to sanctions. Subdivision (b) provides that "[b]ad faith actions or tactics
that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay include actions or tactics that result
from a willful failure to comply with a statutory or regulatory obligation, that result from a willful
intent to disrupt or delay the proceedings of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, or that
are done for an improper motive or are indisputably without merit." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10421(b).) Subdivision(b)(6)-(b)(8) outline considerations for determining whether a position or
defense is indisputably without merit.
WCAB Rule 10421
WCAB Rule 10421 defines bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, including willful failure to comply with obligations or improper motives.
Used to evaluate the nature and scope of conduct subject to sanctions under Labor Code section 5813.
From the decision · page 5II
In addition to the analysis outlined in the Report incorporated hereto, we add the following
analysis.
Section 5813 provides that "[t]he workers' compensation referee or appeals board may
order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees and costs, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay" (Lab. Code, § 5813(a).)
WCAB Rule 10421, promulgated under section 5813, discusses the nature and scope of
conduct that is subject to sanctions. Subdivision (b) provides that "[b]ad faith actions or tactics
that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay include actions or tactics that result
from a willful failure to comply with a statutory or regulatory obligation, that result from a willful
intent to disrupt or delay the proceedings of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, or that
are done for an improper motive or are indisputably without merit." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10421(b).) Subdivision(b)(6)-(b)(8) outline considerations for determining whether a position or
defense is indisputably without merit.
Dubon v. World Restoration, Inc. (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 1298 (Appeals Board en banc)
Dubon v. World Restoration, Inc. (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 1298 (Appeals Board en banc) establishes that the Appeals Board has jurisdiction to determine whether a UR decision is timely and medical necessity if UR is untimely.
Cited to explain the jurisdiction and medical necessity determination in the context of UR denial litigation.
From the decision · page 6Cal.Comp.Cases 1298, the Appeals Board held that it has jurisdiction to determine whether a UR
decision is timely. If a UR decision is untimely, the determination of medical necessity for the
treatment requested may be made by the Appeals Board. (Dubon II, supra, at pages 1299, 1300.)
As noted by the WCJ in her original opinion, she found that the medical reporting was substantial
evidence to rebut the Medical Treatment Utilization Schedule (MTUS) despite applicant not
having completed the recommended course of injections prior to surgical intervention. Defendant
had a genuine basis to argue that the record did not support the treatment based on MTUS. Until
that determination was made by the WCJ, there was a legitimate dispute and defense. Defendant's
position was not without merit pursuant to Dubon II and therefore cannot be the basis for sanctions,
costs, or attorney's fees pursuant to section 5813.
Ramirez v. Drive Financial Services (2008) 73 Cal.Comp.Cases 1324 (Appeals Board en banc)
Ramirez v. Drive Financial Services (2008) 73 Cal.Comp.Cases 1324 (Appeals Board en banc) states that a penalty is payable only when payment has been unreasonably delayed or refused, and a genuine doubt about liability negates unreasonableness.
Applied to determine that defendant's delay was not unreasonable due to genuine legal and medical doubt.
From the decision · page 6Further, we agree with the WCJ that there was not an unreasonable delay pursuant to
section 5814. In Ramirez v. Drive Financial Services (2008) 73 Cal.Comp.Cases 1324, 1331
(Appeals Board en banc), we stated that "section 5814(a)... provides that a penalty is payable
only `[w]hen payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or refused.' (Emphasis
added.) Relevant here, we note that a delay or a refusal to pay is generally not `unreasonable' if
the defendant had `genuine doubt from a medical or legal standpoint as to [its] liability.' (Kerley
v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 223, 230 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 152].)"
Kerley v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 223
Kerley v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 223 establishes that a delay or refusal to pay is not unreasonable if there is genuine doubt from a medical or legal standpoint.
Cited to support that genuine doubt negates unreasonable delay under Labor Code section 5814.
From the decision · page 6Further, we agree with the WCJ that there was not an unreasonable delay pursuant to
section 5814. In Ramirez v. Drive Financial Services (2008) 73 Cal.Comp.Cases 1324, 1331
(Appeals Board en banc), we stated that "section 5814(a)... provides that a penalty is payable
only `[w]hen payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or refused.' (Emphasis
added.) Relevant here, we note that a delay or a refusal to pay is generally not `unreasonable' if
the defendant had `genuine doubt from a medical or legal standpoint as to [its] liability.' (Kerley
v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 223, 230 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 152].)"