ADJ13806639 · October 6, 2025

The WCJ properly deferred the determination of penalties and interest because the lien claimant was not the medical-legal provider and due process requires an evidentiary hearing for penalties; interest was also premature to award.

From the decision · page 5We first turn to lien claimant's argument that because the WCJ awarded the full amount of costs and interest, an award of penalties was mandatory under Labor Code section 4622(a). We reject this argument and clarify that application of Labor Code section 4622 with respect to this lien claimant in this case is improper.

Lien claimant is not the medical-legal provider who rendered the services and thus lacks standing to seek mandatory penalties under Labor Code section 4622(a)(1).

Favours Defendant prevailed

This fact supports deferral of penalties because the penalty provision protects medical-legal providers, not lien claimants who fronted payment.

From the decision · page 6(Report, August 6, 2025, p. 4, § 4.) We agree. (See also, Colamonico v. Secure Transport (2019) 84 Cal.Comp.Cases 1059, 1063 (Appeals Board en banc) ["In sum, sections 4620 and 4621 pertain to a medical-legal provider's service, and section 4622 pertains to the reasonable value of the service]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10786 [implementing, interpreting, or making specific Labor Code section 4622, WCAB Rule 10786 reflects that the focus is on making the medical-legal provider whole.].) Here, lien claimant is not a true lien claimant with respect to applicant's vocational assessment because lien claimant is not the actual medical-legal provider who rendered the medical-legal services for which lien claimant now seeks reimbursement. Instead, lien claimant paid the medical-legal provider for their services and is now seeking reimbursement for those costs. Thus, in this case lien claimant asserts the lien in his capacity as applicant's former attorney, not as a medical-legal provider. However, lien claimant does not step into the shoes of the medical-legal provider who rendered the services by virtue of paying those costs up front. Accordingly, lien claimant does not have standing to seek mandatory penalties under Labor Code section 4622(a)(1).

Labor Code section 4622

Labor Code section 4622(a)(1) penalty and interest provisions apply to medical-legal providers, not lien claimants who are former attorneys.

The penalty provision is designed to protect medical-legal providers, not lien claimants who fronted payment.

From the decision · page 5We first turn to lien claimant's argument that because the WCJ awarded the full amount of costs and interest, an award of penalties was mandatory under Labor Code section 4622(a). We reject this argument and clarify that application of Labor Code section 4622 with respect to this lien claimant in this case is improper.

Labor Code section 5811(a)

Labor Code section 5811(a) allows the Appeals Board to award costs between parties.

Lien claimant's reimbursement claim falls under this section, not section 4622.

From the decision · page 6Because application of Labor Code section 4622 was improper given the facts in this case, we next consider the specific award issued by the WCJ. We note that lien claimant's claim for

Labor Code sections 5814 and 5814.5

Labor Code sections 5814 and 5814.5 govern penalties and fees payable to the applicant, not lien claimants.

Penalties belong to the applicant, and lien claimant does not have standing to seek penalties on his own behalf.

From the decision · page 8In considering lien claimant's request for penalties, it is vital that we highlight the long- held recognition that any penalty under section Labor Code section 5814 belongs to applicant, rather than their attorneys or any lien claimant. (See, Vogh v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 724, 728 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 491] ["If the [Labor Code section 5814] penalty is appropriate, it applies to the compensation to which the applicant is entitled and it is payable to the applicant and not to the lienholder"]; see also Lab. Code, § 4902.) Accordingly, lien claimant does not have standing to seek penalties on his own behalf in connection with his petition for reimbursement of costs; any penalties assessed would be awarded to applicant.2 If a trier of fact subsequently found that an award of penalties was appropriate, any claim by cost petitioner for costs and fees falls under Labor Code section 5814.5.

Lien claimant is not the medical-legal provider and does not have standing to seek mandatory penalties under Labor Code section 4622(a)(1).

From the decision · page 6(Report, August 6, 2025, p. 4, § 4.) We agree. (See also, Colamonico v. Secure Transport (2019) 84 Cal.Comp.Cases 1059, 1063 (Appeals Board en banc) ["In sum, sections 4620 and 4621 pertain to a medical-legal provider's service, and section 4622 pertains to the reasonable value of the service]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10786 [implementing, interpreting, or making specific Labor Code section 4622, WCAB Rule 10786 reflects that the focus is on making the medical-legal provider whole.].) Here, lien claimant is not a true lien claimant with respect to applicant's vocational assessment because lien claimant is not the actual medical-legal provider who rendered the medical-legal services for which lien claimant now seeks reimbursement. Instead, lien claimant paid the medical-legal provider for their services and is now seeking reimbursement for those costs. Thus, in this case lien claimant asserts the lien in his capacity as applicant's former attorney, not as a medical-legal provider. However, lien claimant does not step into the shoes of the medical-legal provider who rendered the services by virtue of paying those costs up front. Accordingly, lien claimant does not have standing to seek mandatory penalties under Labor Code section 4622(a)(1).