Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Labor Code section 3600; South Coast Framing v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291
To be compensable, injury must arise out of and occur in course of employment; burden on employee to prove AOE/COE by preponderance of evidence; medical evidence of reasonable probability is substantial evidence for injury AOE/COE.
Applied to determine compensability and injury causation.
From the decision · page 7II.
To be compensable, an injury must arise out of and occur in the course of employment.
(Lab. Code, § 3600.) The employee bears the burden of proving injury AOE/COE by a
preponderance of the evidence. (South Coast Framing v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark)
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 297-298, 302 [80 Cal.Comp.Cases 489]; Lab. Code, § 3600(a); 3202.5.)
Medical evidence that industrial causation was reasonably probable, although not certain,
constitutes substantial evidence for a finding of injury AOE/COE. (McAllister v. Workmen's
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 408, 417 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 660].) "That burden manifestly
does not require the applicant to prove causation by scientific certainty." (Rosas v. Worker's Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1701 [58 Cal.Comp.Cases 313].)
It is well established that "there can be more than one injury, either specific or cumulative
or a combination of both, arising from the same event or from separate events." (Western Growers
Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Austin) (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 227, 234 [58
Cal.Comp.Cases 323].)
Section 3208.1 defines "injury" as follows:
Labor Code section 3208.1; Labor Code section 5412
Definition of injury includes specific and cumulative injuries; date of cumulative injury determined under Labor Code section 5412.
Applied to define injury and date of injury for cumulative trauma claims.
From the decision · page 7II.
To be compensable, an injury must arise out of and occur in the course of employment.
(Lab. Code, § 3600.) The employee bears the burden of proving injury AOE/COE by a
preponderance of the evidence. (South Coast Framing v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark)
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 297-298, 302 [80 Cal.Comp.Cases 489]; Lab. Code, § 3600(a); 3202.5.)
Medical evidence that industrial causation was reasonably probable, although not certain,
constitutes substantial evidence for a finding of injury AOE/COE. (McAllister v. Workmen's
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 408, 417 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 660].) "That burden manifestly
does not require the applicant to prove causation by scientific certainty." (Rosas v. Worker's Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1701 [58 Cal.Comp.Cases 313].)
It is well established that "there can be more than one injury, either specific or cumulative
or a combination of both, arising from the same event or from separate events." (Western Growers
Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Austin) (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 227, 234 [58
Cal.Comp.Cases 323].)
Section 3208.1 defines "injury" as follows:
Burbank Studios v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Yount) (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 929
Compromise and release agreements are contracts governed by contract law principles; mutual consent and meeting of minds required; clear language of contract governs interpretation.
Applied to interpret the scope of the prior C&R settlement.
From the decision · page 9III.
Contract principles apply to settlements of workers' compensation disputes. The legal
principles governing compromise and release agreements are the same as those governing other
contracts. (Burbank Studios v. Workers' Co. Appeals Bd. (Yount) (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 929,
935.) For a compromise and release agreement to be effective, the necessary elements of a contract
must exist, which includes the mutual consent of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 1550, 1565, 1580;
Yount, supra.) There can be no contract unless there is a meeting of the minds and the parties
mutually agree upon the same thing. (Civ. Code, § 1550, 1565, 1580; Sackett v. Starr (1949) 95
Cal.App.2d 128; Sieck v. Hall (1934) 139 Cal.App. 279, 291; American Can Co. v. Agricultural
Ins. Co. (1909) 12 Cal.App.
Johnson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964
Employer bears burden of proving claim barred by prior compromise and release.
Applied to burden of proof on res judicata defense.
From the decision · page 10First, if the section 5412 date of injury for a body part is after the date of the C&R, the
parties could not have settled that body part. (See Camacho v. Target Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
291, 301 [83 Cal.Comp.Cases 1014] ["[e]ven with respect to claims within the workers'
compensation system, execution of the form does not release certain claims unless specific
findings are made. [Citations.] [Emphasis in original.]"].) Moreover, the employer has the burden
of proving that a claim is barred by an earlier compromise and release. (Johnson v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964, 975 [35 Cal Comp. Cases 362].) Defendant presented no medical
evidence that describes injury to brain, to the nervous system as it relates to psych or stress, or
neurological problems aside from Parkinson's as part of the settlement.
Navarro v. City of Montebello (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 418 (Appeals Bd. en banc)
When a subsequent claim is filed involving same parties and body parts, injured worker has right to new QME evaluation.
Applied to right to new QME evaluation for subsequent claims.
From the decision · page 10In Navarro v. City of Montebello (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 418 (Appeals Bd. en banc),
we held that when a subsequent claim of injury is filed, and even if the subsequent claim of injury
involves the same parties and the same body parts, the injured worker has the right to be evaluated
by a new QME with regard to the subsequently filed claim(s) of injury. (Navarro v. City of
Montebello (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 418, 428 (Appeals Bd. en banc).)