ADJ11784547 · November 5, 2021

Applicant was assigned to kitchen duty as a condition of incarceration, not by voluntary agreement or contract; no consent or consideration existed, and statutory compulsion negates an employment relationship.

From the decision · page 6At the time of trial, the parties stipulated that applicant, while an inmate (OGN 460) on October 1, 2018, (ADJ11784547) at Los Angeles California by the County of Los Angeles at the Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail, claims to have sustained injury arising out of and in the course of his alleged employment (AOE/COE) to his lumbar spine, tailbone or coccyx, head neck and bilateral shoulders, and again on July 21, 2019, (ADJ12536627) to his right foot and toes, right lower extremity.

Applicant was assigned to kitchen duty as a condition of incarceration, not by voluntary agreement or contract.

Favours Defendant prevailed

Statutory compulsion under Penal Code §4017 negates any consensual employment relationship; no contract of hire existed.

From the decision · page 6The statutory compulsion under Penal Code § 4017 to work negates any consensual employment relationship. As in Parsons, it was not so much a choice on the applicant's end so much as it was accepting an act of penal leniency by the County.4 His kitchen duty made no difference on his sentence and provided no credits. The presumption of employment is overcome

Applicant received no reduction of sentence or substantive value for kitchen duty; meals were incidental to incarceration.

Favours Defendant prevailed

No consideration existed for an employment relationship; privilege of better meals was not sufficient consideration.

From the decision · page 7Herein, it is the quality of the food that applicant argues was his consideration. Notably, he had no store money to purchase commissaries, otherwise. The alternative, in his opinion, was truly awful. Being assigned kitchen duty was a privilege, and the choice between food with ingredients that could be identified versus food that was questionable in origin is not so much a choice, as opposed to simply being a matter of self-preservation or a desire for a better quality of life, such as it was, in jail. But the privilege could be also revoked any time by his jailors for any perceived violations.8 As such, this one-sided benefit is an act of penal leniency, rather than the product of a contract. The Court does not find the relationship consensual, or that the applicant's meals were sufficient as consideration, insofar as they were incidental to the incarceration.

Labor Code §3351; Penal Code §4017; Government Code §25359; Parsons v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 629

A county jail inmate injured while performing work mandated as part of a sentence is not an employee and cannot receive workers' compensation benefits unless an employment relationship exists under Labor Code §3351.

Applicant's kitchen duty was incidental to incarceration and not the result of any contract of hire, express or implied.

From the decision · page 7if the essential contract of hire, express or implied, is not present under Labor Code § 3351.5 The Court finds that applicant's kitchen duty was incidental to his incarceration, not the result of any implied bargain or negotiation between petitioner and the County in writing or otherwise. As the defense witness testified, all inmates are required to work somewhere as a condition of incarceration, a rule that is verified in Exhibit C. By virtue of Order 91 being in place, the sole purpose is to exempt inmates in the applicant's position from qualifying for workers compensation benefits.6 As such, the Court finds the County has met its burden of proof.

Testimony of applicant and defense witness confirmed applicant was chosen for kitchen duty, not a volunteer, and all inmates are mandated to work by the County.

From the decision · page 3The Court drew no negative inferences from the incarceration itself and only drew upon the testimony, and the County's directive in Order 91, at Trial. (See Exhibit C; Opinion on Decision 9/1/21, p. 2). Both Petitioner and the defense witness, whom the Court found to be credible, confirmed that Petitioner was selected for the position and did not "volunteer" in the traditional sense. The defendant's witness testified credibly that all inmates are mandated to work by the County. No bargaining occurred to imply consent or consideration, such as under the traditional employment relationship, and supervision was provided.

Applicant admitted supervision was provided during kitchen duty, and that being chosen was a privilege, not a negotiated employment relationship.

From the decision · page 6The traditional features of an employment contract are (1) consent of the parties, (2) consideration for the services rendered, and (3) control by the employer over the employee.2 In the instant case, applicant admitted that officers had "chosen" him for kitchen duty, and this was not something inmates could apply for, or bargain into. The applicant admits that being chosen was considered a "benefit" for a prisoner because it would allow him to eat better than his fellow inmates for the duration of his incarceration, and therefore, he was eager and willing to do it. His only qualification was that he was a non-violent offender.3 By virtue of the fact that he was chosen, and could not apply for the position, the relationship cannot be considered as a de facto employment relationship.